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AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF IMMANUEL
KANT'S "CRITIQUE OF ALL THEOLOGY BASED
UPON SPECULATIVE PRINCIPLES OF REASON"
Michael S. Jones
Quakertown, PA
"For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and
unrighteousness of men, who hold back the truth in unrighteousness;
because that which may be known of God is manifest to them, for God has
shown it to them. For his invisible attributes are clearly seen from the
creation of the world ... "I
From the time of the apostles natural theology has played a role in
Christian theology. Paul seems to refer to it in this passage in Romans, it
was developed extensively by the philosopher/theologianThomas Aquinas,
and it continues to be used today.
Deep in the bowels of liiunanuel Kant's2 first critique, Critique of Pure
Reason, lies a significant examination of this approach to knowing God.
It is entitled "Critique Of All Theology Based Upon Speculative Principles
Of Reason".3 It is a largely negative critique, in that Kant concludes that
natural theology does not provide any veridical knowledge of God. Kant's
discussion is stimulating, but, I will contend, vitally flawed. The thesis of
this article is that Kant's arguments in his "Critique Of All Theology
Based Upon Speculative Principles Of Reason" do not fatally undermine
the enterprise of natural theology.
I. ANALYSIS
A. Definitions
Kant begins his critique of speculative theology by defining some terms
which are significant to the topic and essential to his discussion. He takes
great care to specify exactly what it is that he is opposing, devoting three
and a half out of the seven pages of his discussion to defmitions. Careful
attention must be paid to these defmitions in order to understand the
remarks which follow.
Kant defmes the goal of theology as "knowledge of the original being". 4
This knowledge can be obtained two ways: through revelation, or by the
use of reason. s The latter is what Kant is interested in discussing here;
Kant does not address the former in this discussion.
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The knowledge of the original being which is derived from reason can
be divided into two types: transcendental or natura1. 6 Adherents to a
transcendental theology believe that it is possible to infer an original being
as the (potentially impersonal) cause of the world, but that further
knowledge of such a being is not possible. This is the position of the
deists.7 Transcendental theology can be divided into two types, characterized by differing methodology: 'cosmo-theology' and 'onto-theology'.
Cosmo-theology seeks to infer the existence of the original be~g. from ':an
experience in general" .8 Onto-theology seeks to know the ongmal bemg
through concepts alone. 9
Adherents to natural theology (or at least those adherents who attempt
to obtain knowledge of the absolute being by applying reason) bel~eve ~at
it is possible to infer an original being as the author of the world, Implymg
personality. This is the position of the theists.1O This approach attempts
to infer the existence and properties of the original author from the
constitution, order, and unity of the world. If the inference is made from
the natural order (the laws of nature) it is called "physico-theology". If the
attempt is made from moral order (laws of freedom) it is called "moral
theology". 11 Because most persons un~erstand "God" to refer ~o a
personal being (the theistic conception) rather th~ merely a (potentIally
impersonal) force, Kant limits himself to addressmg the former concept,
o
d'Iscourse. 12
the concept of natural theology, in th IS
Having thus analyzed the concept of original being, Kant turns to an
analysis of the other main component of his definition of theology:
knowledge. He defines the term "theoretical knowlege"l~ as "kn?wled~e
of what is. "14 Theoretical knowledge may be speculatIve, dealmg With
objects or concepts which cannot be known empirically, or it may be
experiential, dealing with things which can .b: known. e~piriCall(5
Theoretical reason is the instrument for obtammg a pnon theoretical
knowledge. 16
B. Arguments 17
Kant begins the polemical section of his discussion by criticizing the
methodology of natural theology. The stratagem employed by natural
theology is to infer the existence of God as the ultimate cause of the ..
world. Cause and effect are properties of the empirical realm. Kant argues
that the author of the world is to be treated as an item of speculative
theoretical knowledge, that God is not an empirical object. It is. not
possible, regarding an item of speculative theoretical knowledge, to m~er
a cause or effect of that item. since cause and effect are properties
restricted to the empirical realm. Therefore, Kant argues, it is not possible
to infer from the world (or anything else, presumably) the existence of a
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cause which is an item of speCUlative theoretical knowledge. Thus it is not
possible to infer. from the world or things known about the world, the
existence or attributes of the original being. Kant concludes that the
employment of speculative theoretical reason in studying nature yields no
theological knowledge. 18
Furthermore, effects are proportional to their causes. Kant states that no
finite empirical effect is of sufficient scope to indicate a cause of the
magnitude of God. 19
Kant observes that transcendental questions demand transcendental (a
priori, non-empirical) answers.20 He concludes that physico-theological
proofs are inadequate to provide theological knowledge21 and relegates
them to the role of lending additional weight to other kinds of proof. 22
After criticizill:1 the strategy employed in natural theology, Kant points
out the epistemological problem at the root of the 'speculative theoretical'
approach to theology. He asserts that the question of the existence of a
supreme being is synthetic; it necessitates the extension of knowledge
beyond the limits of empirical experience to the realm of ideas. 23
Synthetic a priori knowledge is a description of the formal conditions of
an empirical experience.24 But God (according to Kant) is not experienced
empirically (but is rather to be treated as an object of speculative
theoretical knowledge). Therefore God cannot be known synthetically,
through synthesis of empirical experience nor through the synthetic a
priori.
Having successfully. Kant believes, thwarted all attempts at natural
theology using theoretical reason, he concludes that it is not possible to
gain knowledge of an original being using any method which is akin to the
ways people know the other things that they know. 25 What theoretical
reason is useful for is correcting knowledge of the supreme being derived
from other sources, and assessing the internal consistency and external
coherence of such knowledge. This Kant sees as an important. though
largely negative. use.26 Finally. Kant grants that his arguments against the
human ability to prove the existence of a supreme being also indicate an
inability to prove that such a being doesn't exist. 27
II.

CRITIQUE

A. Kant's Definitions
Kant begins his discussion, commendably. with a detailed discussion of
the meanings of th~ terms he is going to be using. Defining one' s terms is
essential
effective discussion and to the dialectical advancement of
philosophical issues. But Kant's definitions are useful beyond their role as
an introduction to his discussion of theology. In his definitions Kant makes
same significant distinctions that fme tune the ideas of/approaches to
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theology. Kant specifically wants to critique the attempt to use theoretical
reason to apply the method of natural physico-theology to obtain speculative theoretical knowledge about the author of the world. He does not
attempt to critique revealed theology, deist theology, or moral theology in
this discussion.
Several weaknesses appear in Kant's series of definitions. He asserts that
the result of transcendental theology is deism, and that deists believe that
it is possible to know the existence but not the attributes of the creator.
This is probably not true of all deists, and does not seem to be a logical
necessity; it seems conceivable that the author of the world could be
entirely transcendent but still have knowable attributes, of which transcendance itself may be one. 28 He also asserts that the result of natural
theology is theism, and that theists believe that it is possible to know both
the existence and at least some of the attributes of the author of the world.
But it seems at least conceivable that a theist might believe in an immanent
and personal God who is hidden from human knowledge either by His own
choice or by some limitation of human ability. Furthermore, it seems
possible that a study of natural theology could result in conclusions
favorable to a transcendental, deistic theology, perhaps emphasizing the
lack of Divine intervention to prevent evil while still affirming the
necessity of an original cause of the world. But these weaknesses do not
detract significantly from Kant's main purpose in this discussion. Perhaps
they are merely the result of permissible generalizations. Over all, his
definitions are useful.
B. Kant's Arguments
In his first argument, Kant points out that natural theology relies on
cause-effect relationships to infer the existence and attributes of God from
empirical evidence. Kant asserts that cause and effect apply only to the
empirical realm and therefore cannot be used to infer anything about a
transcendent God. But Kant does not substantiate this assertion limiting
cause and effect to the empirical realm. He asserts that God is not an
empirical object. But in describing God as "the original being" Kant
implies that his concept of God includes viewing God as the cause of all
else, including the empirical realm. Therefore cause and effect is not
strictly limited to the empirical realm, since the transcendent God is
viewed as a cause.
In his second argument, Kant states that causes and effects are proportional to each other. He argues that no finite empirical effect is of
sufficient scope to indicate a cause of the magnitude of God. But it is
entirely possible that the material universe is of infinite scope. Time may
be of infinite duration, and some theists have argued that God is the cause
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of it. Furthermore, God could be inferred as the cause of some fmite item
which cannot be explained by reference to any other cause. 29
Furthermore, Kant does allow a transcendental approach to speculative
theology in what he calls "moral theology" (see footnote 9). If moral
theology operates using cause-effect relationships (Kant does not say that
it does, but neither does he suggest another mechanism), it stands as a
counter-example to Kant's assertion concerning the problem of causeeffect inference and non-empirical entities.
A more significant argument comes from Kant's obser-vation that
transcendental questions demand transcendental answers. This problem has
troubled many theologians, and is the main point of David Hume's
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. 30 The difficulty of describing a
transcendental subject using man's empirically-oriented speech has led to
the widespread use of anthropomorphisms when trying to describe God.
Such descriptions have only limited success. But limited success is not
failure.
Kant seems to believe that the most basic problem facing attempts at
constructing a natural theology is epistemological: knowledge of the
original being necessitates the extension of knowledge beyond the limits
of empirical experience to the realm of ideas. Synthetic a priori knowledge
is a description of the formal conditions of an empirical experience. 31 But
God (according to Kant) is not experienced empirically. Therefore God
cannot be known synthetically, neither through synthesis of empirical
experience nor through the synthetic a priori.
In respome to this, it need only be hypothesized that the original being
is the penultimate condition of any empirical experience, not merely as the
author of the world, but also as the cause of the world's continued
existence (a doctrine which many theists hold). A God who is active in the
world would be empirically knowable through His actions. This argument
is similar to Kant's first argument (from cause and effect), and the
response is similar as well.
Kant's suggestion, that theoretical reason is useful for correcting
knowledge of the supreme being derived from other sources and for
assessing the internal consistency and external coherence of such
knowledge, seems accurate. His acknowledgement that his arguments
against the human ability to prove the existence of a supreme being also
indicate an inability to prove that such a being doesn't exist is perhaps
gracious, but since his arguments are not up to the first task, they are not
sufficient for the latter either.
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CONCLUSION
In this discussion on natural theology, Kant seeks to examine the use of
theoretical reason in obtaining speculative theoretical knowledge of the
type he calls "natural physico-theology. "He argues, successively, that the
original being cannot be known from the natural world because causeeffect relationships only apply to empirical entities; that an infmite original
being cannot be inferred from a fmite natural world because of the
proportional correspondence between causes and their effects; that
empirical data cannot provide answers to transcendental questions; and that
it is impossible to know a transcendental being by means of a synthetic a
priori. Based upon these arguments Kant concludes that the use of
theoretical reason in the undertaking of natural physico-theology does not
provide any veridical knowledge of the original being.
Kant's arguments have been examined and found wanting. His "Critique
of All Theology Based Upon Speculative Principles of Reason", while
stimulating reading, is vitally flawed. It does not significantly undermine
the enterprise of natural theology.
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B1Ibid, 526.
i2Ibid, 526.
13As opposed to "natural knowledge", which is knowledge of what ought
to be. Ibid, 526.
14Ibid, 526.
"Ibid, 527.
16Ibid, 526. "Speculative or theoretical reason forces us to transcend the
limits of experience and think the unconditioned. C. Stephen Evans,
Subjectivity and Religious Belief, (Grand Rapids: Christian University
Press, 1978),
II

19Por Kant, "practical reason" is the instrument for obtaining a priori
practical knowledge.

4Ibid,525.

I'Kant's arguments in this section appear In different formulations
elsewhere in his first critique, eg: "Por how can any experience ever be
adequate to an idea? The peculiar nature of the latter consists just in the
fact that no experience can ever be equal to it. The transcendental idea of
a necessary and all-sufficient original being is so overwhelmingly great,
so high above everything empirical, the latter being always conditioned,
that it leaves us at a loss, partly because we can never fmd in experience
material sufficient to satisfy such a concept, and partly because it is always
in the sphere of the conditioned that we carry out our search, seeking there
ever vainly for the unconditioned - no law of any empirical synthesis
giving us an example of any such unconditioned or providing the least
guidance in its pursuit." Kant, Pure Reason, 518.

5Ibid,525.

'8Ibid, 527.

6Ibid,525.

19Ibid, 527-8.

'Ibid,525.

20Ibid, 529.

8Ibid, 525. This phrase is ambiguous, but is not essential to Kant's thesis.

llKant does allow a transcendental approach to speculative theology in
what he calls "moral theology", "... the only theology of reason which is
possible is that which is based upon moral laws or seeks guidance from
them. Ibid, 528-9. In his preference for moral theology and aversion to

ENDNOTES
IRomans 1:18-20, my translation
2Par from being trivialized in this "post-modem" age, Kant has become a
spring-board for a variety of 'relativisms'· and is still very ~i~ely read ~
university classrooms. Therefore it is important that the ChnstIan apologist
be familiar with Kant's arguments on philosophy of religion.
'Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1980),525-531.

9Ibid,525.

II

IOIbld, 525.
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natural theology Kant echoed the popular sentiment of the Enlightenment,
see G.E. Michaelson, The Historical Dimensions of a Rational Faith: The
Role of History in Kant's Religious Thought. (Washington, D.C.:
University Press of America, 1979), 55ff.

30David Hume,Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, edited by Richard
H. Popkin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1980). Kant is
believed to have been familiar with this work; Clement C,J. Webb, Kant's
Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926),52.

22Kant, Pure Reason, 529. Kant does not explain how physico-theological
proofs can lend weight to other proofs if physico-theological proofs are not
sound in themselves.

3l Kant, Pure Reason, 529.

23H.W. Cassirer, Kant's First Critique: An Appraisal of the Permanent
Significance of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, (London: George Allen
and Unwin, Ltd., 1954), 313. This is nicely rephrased by Cassirer,
"... reason actually begins with common experience, i.e. something
existing; and it concludes that, if the latter is to preserve any stability at
all, it must be made to rest on the absolute necessary." Hegel is almost
poetic, "The deduction of the categories, setting out from the organic Idea
of productive imagination, loses itself in the mechanical relation of a unity
of self-consciousness which stands in antithesis to the empirical manifold,
either determining it or reflecting on it. Thus transcendental knowledge
transforms itself into formal knowledge [i.e., knowledge of the identity of
form only]. G.W.F. Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, trans. Walter Cerf and
H.S. Harris (NY: State University of New York Press, 1977), 92.
24Kant, Pure Reason, 529.
2SIbid, 530.
26Ibid, 530.
7
2 Ibid,

531.

28Wood points out that "Kant's definition of "deism" .. .is idiosyncratic" and
suggests that it was "a device to deflect reproach from Kant's own
heterodox views." Wood in Philip J. Rossi and Michael Wreen, eds.,
Kant's Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered, (Indianapolis: Indiana
University Press, 1991), 1.
29This Kant himself seems to observe in a later work, "Purposiveness in
the effects always presupposes understanding in the cause." Immanuel
Kant, Lectures On Philosophical Theology, trans. Allen W. Wood and
Gertrude M. Clark (London: Cornell University Press, 1978), 101.

